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Abstract
The individual and household sector accounts for roughly 40 percent of
United States energy use and carbon dioxide emissions, yet the laws and
policies directed at reductions from this sector often reflect a remarkably
simplistic model of behavior. This Essay addresses one of the obstacles to
achieving a “behavioral wedge” of individual and household emissions
reductions: the lack of an accessible, brief summary for policymakers of the
key findings of behavioral and social science studies on household energy
behavior. The Essay does not provide a comprehensive overview of the field,
but it discusses many of the leading studies that demonstrate the extent and
limits of rational action. These studies can inform lawyers and policymakers
who are developing measures to reduce energy use and carbon emissions and
can serve as an entry point for more detailed studies of the literature.
∗

Post Doctoral Fellow, Climate Change Research Network, Vanderbilt Institute for Energy
and Environment, Vanderbilt University.
∗
Carlton Tarkington Professor of Law, Co-Director, Regulatory Program and Director,
Climate Change Research Network, Vanderbilt University Law School. This Essay was
supported by funds from Vanderbilt Law School and the Vanderbilt Climate Change
Research Network. We would like to thank Jack Barkenbus for his valuable comments on
this draft, as well as Associate Dean Lee Paddock and the participants at the George
Washington University Law School Next Generation Energy and the Law Conference and the
editors of the Journal of Energy and Environmental Law.
∗
Principal Staff Officer, National Research Council/National Academy of Sciences, and
Director, Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change. This work is that of the
authors as individuals, and is not a product of the National Research Council.
∗
Professor Emeritus of Psychology, Department of Behavioral Sciences, University of
Michigan, Dearborn.
∗
Professor of Sociology and Environmental Science, Department of Sociology and
Environmental Science and Policy Program, and Assistant Vice President for Environmental
Research, Michigan State University. Support for this project was provided by the Michigan
Agricultural Experiment Station.
∗
Associate Professor, Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, and Associate
Director for Research, Climate Change Research Network, Vanderbilt University.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1612224

An effective response to the climate change problem will require
substantial reductions in energy demand in addition to new developments in
low-carbon energy supplies. 1 The individual and household sector presents
a major opportunity: the sector accounts for roughly 40% of U.S. carbon
emissions and a comparable percentage of total U.S. energy production, 2
and it is one of the most promising areas for reducing emissions. 3 A recent
analysis estimates that behavioral measures directed at this sector could
reasonably be expected to reduce total US emissions by over 7% by 2020,
an amount larger than the combined emissions from several of the largestemitting industrial sectors and larger than the total emissions of France.4 In
many cases, these emissions reductions can be achieved at less cost than the
leading alternatives.5
Despite this opportunity, recent regulatory and policy efforts are
only beginning to direct substantial attention to the individual and household
sector. Findings from the social sciences provide valuable insights into how
to capitalize on this opportunity, yet policymakers often have little time to
develop new polices and are confronted with a barrage of often-conflicting
approaches and theories. This Essay addresses the policymaking challenge
1

See Nathan S. Lewis, Powering the Planet, 2 ENG. & SCI. 12, 19 (2007). See also Steven
Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next
50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 969 (2004).
2
Compare Shui Bin & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Consumer Lifestyle Approach to U.S. Energy Use
and the Related CO2 Emissions, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 197, 205 (2005)(estimating 28% and 41%
share of U.S. energy and CO2 emissions due to direct behavior) with Shui Bin, Re-estimation
and Reflection: The Role of Consumer Demand in US Energy Use and CO2 Emissions, paper
presented at the 2004 ACEEE Summer Study on Energy Efficiency in Buildings, Panel 7,
retrieved April 16, 2010 from
http://www.eceee.org/conference_proceedings/ACEEE_buildings/2004/Panel_7/p7_4/
(estimating 38% and 42% share of energy use and emissions). See also Gerald T. Gardner &
Paul C. Stern, The Short List: The Most Effective Actions U.S. Households Can Take to Curb
Climate Change, 50 ENVIRON 12, 16 (2008) [hereinafter Gardner & Stern, The Short
List](estimating 38% share of energy use); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann,
The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1694 (2007)(estimating 32% share
of US CO2 emissions in 2000).
3
See, e.g., Thomas Dietz et al.,, Household Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to
Rapidly Reduce U.S. Carbon Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18452
(2009)(concluding that 123 million metric tons of carbon emissions reductions could be
achieved in ten years); HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE US ECONOMY 10 (2009)(noting the magnitude of the efficiency
opportunities in the residential sector).
4
Thomas Dietz et al., supra note 3, at 18453-454.
5
See, e.g., Hunt Allcott & Sendhil Mullainathan, Behavior and Energy Policy, 327 SCIENCE
1204, 1204-05 (2010)(concluding that a behavioral intervention of the type recently
implemented by OPOWER “scaled across the United States would net $2.2 billion per year
over the program’s life”); FLORIAN BRESSAND ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., CURBING
GLOBAL ENERGY DEMAND GROWTH: THE ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY OPPORTUNITY 57
(2007)(noting that the residential sector may be one of the top two global opportunities for
low-cost CO2 emissions reductions); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus & Jonathan
Gilligan, Climate Change: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1758 (2008).
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by distilling the findings from a broad range of fields into several key
principles for those developing energy and climate laws and policies. The
principles we outline here are a starting point for policymakers working in
this area. We attempt to provide insight into which principles are most
relevant to law and policy, but instructions as to how to incorporate these
principles are beyond the scope of this essay. The principles include only a
subset of the insights from the behavioral and social science literature. In
many cases, adherence to multiple principles will be necessary to develop
the most effective policy design. Policymakers should consult the body of
work referenced here, as well as experts in the social sciences to further
their understanding of these and other principles. More extensive reviews of
this literature and its relevance to energy and climate policy are also
available. 6

KEY BEHAVIORAL PRINCIPLES
1. Price Plays an Important but Limited Role. Price clearly
affects behavior; however, the impact is easily overstated. Often price
accounts for less variance in behavior than other factors such as personal
commitment or social norms. 7 Policymakers often gravitate towards pricebased mechanisms when attempting to influence product purchase decisions,
using rebates or other incentives. Although price offsets are often effective
at inducing purchases of efficient products, studies find that when the
monetary value of price incentives is held constant participation rates can
vary by a factor of ten as a result of other variables. 8 This variance is
largely explained by non-financial variables such as program marketing and
management or the ease of participating in the program. 9 These data also
6

See, e.g., Paul C. Stern, Environmentally Significant Behavior in the Home, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR, 363-382 (A. LEWIS ED.
2008); Paul C. Stern, Blind Spots in Policy Analysis: What Economics Doesn’t Say about
Energy Use, 5 J. POLICY ANAL. MANAG. 200 (1986) [hereinafter Stern, Blind Spots]; Paul C.
Stern, What Psychology Knows about Energy Conservation, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 1224 (1992)
[hereinafter Stern, What Psychology Knows], Charles Wilson & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Models of
Decision Making and Residential Energy Use. 32 ANNU. REV. ENVIRON. RESOUR. 169 (2007),
Wokje Abrahamse, et al., A Review of Intervention Studies Aimed at Household Energy
Conservation, 25 J ENVIRON PSYCHOL 273 (2005); GERALD T. GARDNER & PAUL C. STERN.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR, 2ND ED. (2002) [hereinafter Gardner &
Stern, ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS], Paul C. Stern, Gerald T. Gardner, Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Thomas Dietz, Jonathan M. Gilligan, Design Principles for Carbon Emissions
Reduction Programs, ENVIRON SCI TECHNOL (forthcoming).
7
See Thomas A. Heberlein & G. Keith Warriner, The Influence of Price and Attitude on
Shifting Residential Electricity Consumption From On- to Off-Peak Periods, 4 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 107, 125 (1983). Jessica M. Nolan et al., Normative Social Influence is
Underdetected, 34 PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 913, 921 (2008).
8
Stern, Blind Spots, supra note 6 at 210 - 211.
9
Id.
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suggest that the stronger the financial incentives, the more critical nonfinancial factors are in inducing participation.10 Additional data show that
individuals can be induced to change their behavior even when they are not
financially responsible for their energy costs. 11 Interventions such as realtime feedback or comparative energy reports can reduce consumption within
the range of 5 to 15% even without changes in price.12 Policymakers should
not assume that home metering or other demand-side management programs
are only valuable if they are linked to variable pricing. If the political will
does not exist to raise price, or if fears about pricing create public resistance,
then the price assumption could undermine what would otherwise be a quite
viable means of making important reductions in energy use and carbon
emissions.
2. Both Technology Adoption and Use are Important.
Policymakers should target both product purchase decisions (i.e., efficiency)
as well as product use (i.e., curtailment) to maximize the potential for
emissions reductions within the individual and household sector. Efficiency
improvements generally offer greater long-term potential for reducing
energy use and emissions. 13 Once upgraded, savings can be achieved
without relying on consumers to develop and maintain energy-saving habits,
and may reduce actual or perceived sacrifices in lifestyle and comfort
sometimes associated with curtailment. However, these actions also involve
a greater up-front cost to the consumer and may be slower to realize due to
the rate at which appliances are retired and replaced. Furthermore, studies
suggest that behavior is sometimes as important as the physical properties of
a product. The Twin Rivers project demonstrated that energy use in
identically constructed homes with similar appliances and demographic
characteristics varied by as much as much as 300% due to behavior. 14
Efficiency gains through technological innovation can also be weakened by
“take-back” effects, in which a portion of the technologically achievable
10

Id.
For example, interventions have successfully reduced energy use among office employees,
dormitory residents, and individuals living on military bases. For a workplace example, see
Amanda R. Carrico & Manuel Riemer, Motivating Pro-Environmental Behavior in an
Organizational Setting: The Use of Feedback and Peer Education to Reduce Energy Use.
Abstract presented at the Behavior Energy and Climate Change Conference, Washington
D.C. (2009). For a dormitory example, see John E. Petersen, et al., Dormitory Residents
Reduce Electricity Consumption When Exposed to Real-Time Visual Feedback and
Incentives, 8 INT. J. SUST. HIGH. EDUC. 16, 29 (2007). For military base example, see Andrea
H. McMakin et al., Motivating Residents to Conserve Energy Without Financial Incentives,
34 ENVIRON. BEHAV. 848, 856 (2002).
12
See Wokje Abrahamse, et al., supra note 6, at 278 - 280.
13
For example, purchasing a fuel efficient vehicle offers greater potential energy savings than
the combined savings of carpooling, trip-chaining, reducing highways speeds, and avoiding
sudden acceleration and stops. Gardner & Stern, The Short List, supra note 2, at 17.
14
See Loren Lutzenhiser, Social and Behavioral Aspects of Energy Use, 18 Ann. Rev.
Energy Environ. 247, 289 (1993).
11

4
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savings is offset by an increase in the use of energy. 15 For these reasons,
policymakers should select a balance of behavioral targets based on their
potential impact as well as the rate at which reductions can be realized and
the level at which they can be expected to be maintained. Simultaneously
targeting decisions regarding the purchase of efficient products as well as
how those products are used can increase the potential of both near- and
long-term emissions reductions while reducing the magnitude of take-back
effects.
3. Economic Incentives Can Be Counterproductive. Relying
solely on economic incentives or disincentives to change behavior can lead
to motivational crowding, which occurs when external rewards undermine
intrinsic motivation resulting in a reduction in the desired behavior. 16 For
example, in an effort to reduce the number of parents who arrive late to pick
up their children, a group of day cares in Israel imposed a fine per child for
any parent who arrived 10 minutes late or more. Rather than noticing a
reduction in late pick-ups, these instances nearly doubled during the weeks
after the fine was introduced and remained at that level even after the fine
was removed. 17 Introducing external rewards or punishments in situations
that are otherwise governed by moral norms has been shown to grant
individuals a license to behave in self-interested ways. 18 This principle is
most relevant to behaviors that are performed frequently and when the
financial incentives/disincentives are perceived to be relatively trivial.
Policymakers should be careful to avoid introducing economic incentives or
penalties to change behaviors that may already be governed by moral norms.
When economic incentives or disincentives are deemed appropriate,
policymakers should also consider reinforcing moral norms using other
avenues such as public education. There is some evidence that pairing
economic disincentives with public outreach or moral persuasion can have
synergistic effects. 19
15
For example, studies suggest that households tend to increase their thermostat settings
during the winter after weatherizing their homes, resulting in a decrease in the potential
energy saving based on the technologically achievable potential of the changes, See Eric
Hirst et al., Indoor Temperature Changes in Retrofit Homes, 10 ENERGY 861, 870 (1985).
See also H. Herring, Energy Efficiency—A Critical View, 31 ENERGY 10, 12 (2006); M.
Binswanger, Technological Progress and Sustainable Development: What About Rebound
Effects, 36 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 119, 130 (2001).
16
See B.S. Frey, Motivation as a Limit to Pricing, 14 J. ECON. PSYCH. 635, 658 (1993). See
also E.L. Deci et al., Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effect of Extrinsic
Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 658-659 (1999).
17
U. Gneezy & A. Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 22 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (2000).
18
S. Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine “The Moral
Sentiments”: Evidence from Economic Experiments, 320 SCIENCE 1605, 1609 (2008); Ann E.
Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames, and Cooperation,
44 ADMIN. SCI. QUART. 684, 704 (1999).
19
For example, a tax on plastic grocery bags in Ireland paired with an aggressive media
campaign led to a 94% drop in the use of plastic bags. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Motivated by a

5
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4. Decision Making is Limited by Incorrect or Incomplete
Information. Traditional rational actor models of human behavior often
assume that individuals have full and accurate information about their set of
options. Policymakers should not assume this to be the case. Individuals
often act in ways they perceive to be in their own self-interest, or to benefit
the common good, when in fact their actions are counterproductive to these
ends. For example, the average individual in the United States believes it is
both economically and environmentally beneficial to idle one’s vehicle for
three minutes or more before turning it off.20 In fact, the Environmental
Protection Agency recommends idling for no more than 30 seconds to save
gas, reduce emissions, and prevent vehicle wear and tear. In this case, it is
estimated that inaccurate beliefs are associated with over 8 million metric
tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually. Additional surveys find large
knowledge deficits, in general, among consumers regarding how to save
energy, often leading them to over-emphasize the impact of curtailment
behaviors and under-emphasize the impact of efficiency upgrades.21
Although simply providing information to consumers is rarely sufficient to
change behavior, 22 accurate and actionable information is often a necessary
component to achieving this end.
5. Decision Making is Limited by Our Ability to Process
Information. A growing body of literature within psychology and
behavioral economics reveals that individuals often fail to make decisions
on the basis of a calculation of the expected utility of a set of options. 23
Most relevant to the discussion of energy and climate change is the tendency
for individuals to act as if they are applying steep discount rates when
making product purchase decisions. For instance, relative to the up-front
cost of purchasing a more efficient appliance, consumers tend to devalue
savings achieved through lower operating costs at a rate that is well above
Tax, Irish Spurn Plastic Bags, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008. Retrieved February 7, 2010 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/02/world/europe/02bags.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
Combining public education with regulatory measures has also been successfully used to
reduce vehicle idling in a number of Canadian communities, See Lura Consulting, The
Carrot, The Stick, and the Combo: A Recipe for Reducing Vehicle Idling in Canadian
Communities, Report prepared for Natural Resources Canada, Clean Air Partnership (2005).
http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/communities-government/transportation/municipalcommunities/reports/carrot-stick-combo/carrot-stick-combo.pdf
20
Amanda R. Carrico et al., Costly Myths: An Analysis of Idling Beliefs and Behavior in
Personal Motor Vehicles, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 2881, 2885 (2009).
21
Shahzeen Z. Attari et al., Perceptions of Energy Consumption and Savings, working paper
(2010); Willett Kempton et al., Do Consumers Know “What Works” in Energy Conservation,
9 MARRIAGE FAM. REV. 115 (1985).
22
See Wokje Abrahamse et al., supra note 11, at 278.
23
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN
FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008).

6

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1612224

market value. 24 This may be partially due to uncertainties about potential
savings or future energy costs; 25 however, additional data suggest that
individuals may simply miscalculate potential savings associated with
operating costs 26 or may fail to consider operating costs altogether so that
what appears to be a steep discount rate in an expected utility calculation
may well be a decision made on a different calculus altogether. 27 As such,
consumers often make product purchase and use decisions that are
economically disadvantageous to the consumer when the lifecycle costs of
operating a product are considered. Well-designed labels and educated
salespersons can provide information regarding lifecycle costs at the point
of sale that consumers often fail to properly consider.
6. Cognitive Costs Matter. Traditional rational actor models tend
to underestimate the cognitive costs associated with seeking out, evaluating
and acting on new information. Individuals often fall prey to a “status quo
bias” in which they revert to the default option due to its convenience, even
when that option may be less preferable to the individual.28 Major
reductions in carbon emissions could be achieved by policies that specify
default settings in such a way as to “nudge” consumers towards the
economically or socially optimal options. 29 In many cases default settings
are unavoidable, and current policies (or the lack thereof) are, in effect,
nudging consumers towards less than desirable choices. For example, a
policy requiring new water heater installations to be set at the Department of
Energy’s (DOE) recommended level of 120oF, rather than the more typical
residential setting of 135oF could substantially reduce emissions and energy
costs for the consumer with no impact on comfort. 30 Policies that take steps
24
See Jerry A. Hausman, Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of
Energy Using Durables,10 BELL J. ECON. 33 (1979). See also Richard Howarth & Alan H.
Sanstad, Discount Rates and Energy Efficiency, 13 CONTEMP. ECON. POLICY 101 (1995);
Kenneth Gillingham et al., Energy Efficiency Economics and Policy, 1 ANN. REV. OF
RESOURCE ECONOMICS 597 (2009).
25
See A. Jaffe, R. Newell & R. Stavins, The Energy-Efficiency Gap, 22 ENERGY POLICY 804,
805 (1994).
26
Willet Kempton & L. Montgomery, Folk Quantification of Energy, 7 ENERGY 817, 826
(1982).
27
Daniel C. Feiler & Jack B. Soll, A Blind Spot in Driving Decisions: How Neglecting Costs
Puts Us in Overdrive, 98 CLIMATIC CHANGE 285, 289 (2010).
28
See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler. Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron,
70 U CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). For an example of the effect of the status quo bias in rates of
organ donation, see also Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives, 302
SCIENCE 1338, 1339 (2003).
29
See RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008);
30
The DOE recommends 120oF as a level that provides a water temperature that meets the
needs of most users. U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Savers Tips on Saving Energy and
Money at Home: Water Heating. Accessed February 4 2010 at
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/consumer/tips/water_heating.html The DOE assumes 135oF as
the standard set point of a water heater in households when determining energy demand; U.S.
Department of Energy. Technical Support Document: Energy Efficiency Standards for

7
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to make efficiency and conservation more convenient also have greater
prospects for success. 31 Home efficiency programs that make it easy to find
competent installers or that minimize the number of steps required to
participate are more successful than those that require multiple stages. For
example, programs that require a home energy audit to be eligible for home
insulation rebates are less successful than those do not require this extra
step. 32 Governments and utilities tend to impose paperwork burdens on
households to ensure accountability, but these are likely to substantially
reduce participation. Successful programs may need to accept a certain
level of misuse in order to achieve widespread adoption, but the benefits of
widespread adoption may far outweigh the costs of the misuse. In a sense,
too much attention to misuse can lead to policies that are suboptimal.
7. Choices Depend on the Way the Options Are Framed.
Individual choices are not always grounded in a stable set of preferences as
many in law and economics have assumed. A large and growing body of
literature suggests than even when the expected utility of a set of options is
identical, individuals reliably prefer certain choices more than others as a
function of how those choices are framed. 33 For example, individuals favor
a hamburger that is 75% lean over one that is 25% fat. 34
Likewise,
consumers are more willing to invest in a water heater blanket when it is
framed as a way to avoid losing money, rather than a way to save money. 35
Many times frames invoke systematic deviations from what neoclassical
economists would view as rational, such as the tendency for losses to loom
larger than gains when outcomes are effectively equivalent (as evidenced in
the water heater example used above). In other case, frames interact with
an individual’s previous experiences or ideological worldview to trigger
Consumer Products: Residential Water Heaters; Appendix D-2. Water Heater Analysis
Model (WHAM), 2000.
31
See Paul C. Stern, Information, Incentives, and Proenvironmental Consumer Behavior, 22
J. CONS. POL. 461, 468-469 (1986)[hereinafter Stern, Consumer Behavior]. See also Paul C.
Stern, What Psychology Knows, supra note 6 at 1229]. Studies suggest that the convenience
of an action stands out as a primary predictor of whether an individual chooses to adopt it.
For example, the availability of curbside recycling bins is the strongest predictor of whether a
household recycles. See G. Wall, Barriers to Individual Environmental Action: The Influence
of Attitudes and Social Experiences, 32 CAN. REV. SOC. ANTHROP. 465, 477 (1995).
Similarly, Ludwig et al. show that placing recycling bins in college classrooms where drinks
are consumed rather than in the hallway decreased the number of cans thrown in the
conventional trash by 50%. See Timothy D. Ludwig et al., Increasing Recycling in Academic
Buildings: A Systematic Replication, 31 J. APPL. BEHAV. ANAL. 683, 685 - 686 (1998).
32
Stern, Consumer Behavior, supra note 33, at 468.
33
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM PSYCHOL
341 (1984). See also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 25, at 453.
34
I.P. Levin & G.J. Gaeth, Framing of Attribute Information Before and After Consuming the
Product, 15 J. CONS. RES. 374, 376 (1988).
35
S. Yates, Using Prospect Theory to Create Persuasive Communications about Solar Water
Heaters and Insulation. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Santa
Cruz. See also Stern, What Psychology Knows, supra note 6, at 1227 – 1228.

8
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certain responses. For example, the term “tax” triggers many negative
associations among those who are ideologically conservative that the term
“offset” does not. Consequentially, more Republicans (and Independents)
are willing to purchase a more expensive product when its cost is inflated
due to a “carbon offset” rather than a “carbon tax.”36 In most cases, it is
simply impossible to avoid framing information. Instead of attempting to
avoid framing effects, policymakers should consult psychologists or
behavioral economists when developing messages that frame choices.
Policymakers should be careful to avoid frames that may be polarizing, or
prevent audience members from fully considering an argument or policy
proposal. Similarly, we should not assume from an initial negative reaction
that the public is unwilling to accept certain policy measures. Re-framing
an issue in a way that challenges the public’s preconceived beliefs may
stimulate more thoughtful consideration of an issue.
8. People Do Not Always Act the Way They Feel. When
designing public education campaigns, decisionmakers often gravitate
toward an attitude-persuasion model for changing behavior. Although this
approach may raise levels of awareness and concern, there are a host of
other barriers—psychological and structural—that often prevent individuals
from acting the way they feel. Individuals may hold strong values to protect
the environment on an abstract level, but these values are often overcome by
countervailing influences at the time when decisions are made, such as the
desire for convenience or status. 37 Similarly, an individual may have good
intentions to reduce driving, for example, yet these intentions may be
complicated by a busy schedule or infrastructure barriers. 38 For these
reasons, marketing a behavior is very different then marketing a product.
Traditional marketing approaches, which tend to target attitudes, have had
some success in raising levels of awareness and concern, but have a poor
track record for success in promoting behavior change. 39 Successful social
marketing efforts will take a systematic approach to understanding the
36

David J. Hardisty, Eric J. Johnson & Elke U. Weber, A Dirty Word or a Dirty World?
Attribute Framing, Political Affiliation, and Query Theory, 21 PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 86, 88
(2010).
37
Gregory A. Guagnano, Paul C. Stern & Thomas Dietz, Influences on Attitude-Behavior
Relationships: A Natural Experiment with Curbside Recycling, 27 ENVIRONMENT AND
BEHAVIOR 699, 713 (1995)(noting that the impact of attitudes on behavior are bounded by
contextual factors that may reduce their applicability).
38
For example, in a survey among self-identified environmentalists, individuals cite poor
community infrastructure as a common reason for not engaging in pro-environmental
behaviors. C.C. Quimby & H. Angelique, Barriers to Behavior Changes Related to Global
Climate Change. Poster presented at the 11th Biennial Conference for the Society for
Community Research and Action 40, Pasadena, California (2007).
39
See Wokje Abrahamse et al. A Review of Intervention Studies Aimed at Household Energy
Conservation. 25 J ENVIRON.. PSYCHOL. 273, 291 (2005); M. Costanzo, et al., Energy
Conservation Behavior: The Difficult Path from Information to Action, 41 AM. PSYCHOL 521
– 528 (1986).

9
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barriers that may prevent individuals from adopting a behavior, such as
convenience, access, or psychological barriers such as perceptions of
efficacy and control. 40 Programs designed to overcome or minimize these
barriers (to the extent possible) have a greater likelihood of success. For
example, programs to promote the use of smoke alarms have achieved
adoption rates within the range of 33 to 95% using door-to-door canvassing
to distribute alarms. This method also used less financial and volunteer
resources than using flyers to inform households of free alarm giveaways. 41
Behavioral targets should be selected based on the potential impact of
changing a behavior as well as the likelihood that a behavior can be changed
(i.e., plasticity). In many cases, changes in infrastructure (i.e., improved
access to public transportation) may be necessary before social marketing or
other behavioral interventions have any chance of success for that behavior.
Policymakers should be cognizant of these factors when allocating resources
and should consult experts in social marketing in addition to those who have
expertise in product marketing. 42
9. People Often Follow the Crowd. Humans generally do not like
to be in the minority. Bringing attention to common behaviors within a
population, termed a descriptive norm, will induce many individuals to
conform to that behavior. For example, learning that one’s peers are taking
steps to conserve energy, recycle, or even reuse a bathroom towel before
sending it to laundry induces many to do the same. 43 A recent study has
shown that providing utility customers with a bar graph displaying their
recent monthly electricity use compared to a group of comparable neighbors
and a group of “efficient neighbors” led to a 1 to 2% reduction in electricity
use through curtailment that persisted for up to a year after the intervention
was initiated. 44 Although logical on the surface, this psychological principle
40

See DOUGLAS MCKENZIE MOHR, FOSTERING SUSTAINABLE BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION
TO COMMUNITY BASED SOCIAL MARKETING (1999).

41

Van M. Ta et al., Evaluated Community Fire Safety Interventions in the United States: A
Review of Current Literature, 31 J COMMUN HEALTH 176, 197 (2006).
42
For an overview of social marketing techniques, see DOUGLAS MCKENZIE MOHR, supra
note 46.
43
P. Wesley Schultz, Changing Behavior with Normative Feedback Interventions: A Field
Experiment on Curbside Recycling, 21 BASIC APPL. SOC. PSYCH. 25, 36 (1998); Noah J.
Goldstein et al, A Room with a Viewpoint: Using Social Norms to Motivate Environmental
Conservation in Hotels, 35 J. CONSUMER RES. 472 (2008); P. Wesley Schultz et al., The
Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social Norms, 18 PSYCH. SCIENCE
429 (2007).
44
Ian Ayres et al., Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer Comparison
Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage, Working Paper available for download
here: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15386. These data suggest that even larger gains may
also be possible by tailoring home energy reports to high energy-using households. In this
study, the highest energy users reduced their energy use by around 7% while the lowest
energy-using households (which received feedback that they used less energy than their
peers) actually increased energy, again demonstrating the impact of social norms in both
directions.
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requires many to suspend intuition regarding how to motivate behavior
change. Public information campaigns often begin with statements to
explicate the scale of the problem. By doing this, they may be inadvertently
promoting the undesirable behavior by communicating a descriptive norm. 45
These findings indicate that it is better to emphasize what people are “doing
right” than what they “aren’t doing right.” When what is typical within a
group is undesirable, it is better to emphasize what is desirable (i.e., an
injunctive norm) while de-emphasizing the undesirable norm. Furthermore,
identifying and promoting “early adopters” of efficient technologies and
behaviors may be a powerful means of triggering processes of normative
influence, particularly when individuals are well-known or respected
members of a community. Work on diffusion of innovation suggests that the
adoption of new technologies such as solar panels often follow patterns of
social affiliation and group membership. 46
10. People Strive for Consistency. Dissonance refers to the
discomfort that is felt when a person holds contradictory ideas, cognitions,
or behaviors. 47 For example, a self-proclaimed environmentalist would
likely feel anxious about purchasing an inefficient vehicle or failing to
recycle a plastic bottle. To reduce dissonance, individuals will modify an
attitude, belief or behaviors to bring them in line with one another. Those
interested in changing behavior have learned that calling attention to
behavioral inconsistencies can motivate individuals to act more in line with
the way that they feel. For example, individuals who express attitudes in
support of resource conservation have been shown to curtail water and
energy use after receiving feedback indicating that they are high users of a

45
For example, in an effort to reduce the amount of petrified wood stolen from park lands,
Arizona’s Petrified Forest National Park posted signs reading, “Your heritage is being
vandalized every day by theft losses of petrified wood of 14 tons a year, mostly a small piece
at a time.” When the sign was changed to simply communicate that removing wood is
undesirable (i.e., an injunctive norm) rates of theft declined from 8% to just under 2%.
Robert B. Cialdini, Crafting Normative Messages to Protect the Environment, 12 CURR. DIR.
PSYCH. SCI. 105, 107 (2004).
46
J.M. Darley, Energy Conservation Techniques as Innovations and Their Diffusion, 1
ENERG. BUILDINGS 339, 343 (1978); S. Sawyer, Leaders in Change: Solar Energy Owners
and the Implications for Future Adoption Rates, 21 TECHNOL. FORECAST SOC. 201, 211
(1982). Additional work within the public health literature suggests that opinion leaders can
have a powerful influence on behavior. For example, interventions that recruited popular
members of the gay community to communicate messages about HIV/AIDS prevention led to
a 30% decline in the percentage of individuals who reported having unprotected intercourse
within that community. Jeffrey A. Kelly et al., Randomised Controlled, Community-Level
HIV-Prevention Intervention for Sexual-Risk Behaviour Among Homosexual Men in US
Cities, 350 LANCET 1500, 1504 (1997). For a replication of this effect, see also Jeffrey Kelly
et al., HIV Risk Behavior Reduction Following Intervention with Key Opinion Leaders of
Population: An Experimental Analysis, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 168, 171 (1991).
47
See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
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resource. 48 Individuals asked to make an upfront commitment are also more
likely to follow through and adopt that behavior. 49 To our knowledge this
approach has not been studied with respect to efficiency decisions; however,
individuals who hold positive attitudes towards the environment, or resource
conservation in general, may be motivated by messages that prime them to
consider the energy use impacts of their appliance purchase at the point of
decision. Although there are deep political divisions over climate change,
the majority of Americans value environmental protection and energy
efficiency regardless of their political affiliations.50 When the impact of
one’s purchase decision (or product use decision) is made salient, this may
induce dissonance for individuals if they cannot otherwise rationalize their
actions. 51
CONCLUSION
The principles we present here are a starting point for
decisionmakers to begin to incorporate social scientific findings into their
analyses. Adding these insights can improve the prospects for success of
laws, programs, and policies directed at individual and household behavior.
To maximize the potential for success, policymakers should combine
multiple approaches to behavior change, including measures to reduce
cognitive costs, increase motivation, provide more actionable and pertinent
information, etc. In most cases, a single approach to changing behavior
(such as the provision of information) is not sufficient to induce meaningful
levels of behavior change and, therefore, multiple strategies are needed to
target a wider audience and to encourage greater rates of adoption.52
Policymakers should consult experts in the field, as well as the literature
referenced here, to further their understanding of these principles and how to
apply them.
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C.K. Aitken et al., Residential Water-Use – Predicting and Reducing Consumption, 24 J.
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Edward Maibach et al., Saving Energy is a Value Shared by All Americans: Results of a
Global Warming Audience Segmentation Analysis, HUMAN RESOURCES FOR CLIMATE
SOLUTIONS: ENERGY SMART BEHAVIORS, PEOPLE CENTERED POLICIES, AND PUBLIC
ENGAGEMENT. Ed. Karen Ehrhardt-Martinez (forthcoming).
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